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ABSTRACT
Shareholder inspection rights allow a shareholder to access
the relevant documents of the company in which they hold an
interest, so as to address the problem of information asymmetry
and reduce the agency costs inherent in the corporate structure.
While Chinese corporate governance and American corporate
governance face different sets of agency cost problems, this
Article shows that shareholder inspection rights play an
important role in both China and the United States. On the
books, while shareholder inspection rights in both countries are
broadly similar, there are some important differences on issues
such as the proper purpose requirement. The empirical analysis
of this Article further sheds light on how inspection rights
operate on the ground. A good number of inspection cases are
filed in both China and in Delaware. These cases are resolved
by the courts relatively quickly. While inspection rights in both
countries are frequently used as a presuit discovery device, the
types of subsequent litigation that can be filed in each country
are quite different. Efforts are made to explain, and draw
implications from, the similarities and differences on
shareholder inspection rights between the two countries.
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SHAREHOLDERINSPECTION RIGHTS: CHINA AND THE US
L INTRODUCTION
The shareholder's right to inspect corporate documents has a
long history, originating in the common law in the 1700s.' In the
United States, all states have now codified shareholder inspection
rights, albeit with some significant differences amongst them. 2
Drawing upon overseas experiences such as the US law, China
introduced the concept of shareholder inspection rights in broad
terms when its first national company law was enacted in 1993 and
has since continued to improve the regime, particularly in the 2005
company law revision.3
Shareholder inspection rights allow a shareholder to access the
documents of the company in which they hold an interest, so as to
address the problem of information asymmetry and reduce the agency
costs inherent in the corporate structure. By inspecting corporate
documents, the shareholders can obtain relevant information to
monitor the company's performance, evaluate the company's financial
status, and determine whether and how to take proper action such as
a proxy fight to replace the incumbent management team or a
derivative suit against directors and others who cause harm to the
company.
As is well recognized in comparative corporate law scholarship,
agency problems, and thus the strategies used to deal with them,
differ systematically across jurisdictions. 4 There are three main
agency problems in a company, namely the conflict between the
shareholders and the managers, the conflict between the majority
shareholders and the minority shareholders, and the conflict between
the shareholders and the nonshareholder stakeholders such as
creditors, employees, and customers. In the United States, where the
publicly traded company is characterized by dispersed ownership, the
shareholder-manager conflict is the main type of agency problem. In
contrast, in China, where the ownership of shares is more
concentrated in the hands of majority shareholders, whether the state
or wealthy families, the second agency problem is more severe. In
1. Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate
Management by Expanding Statutory Access to information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.3 31, 337
(1996).
2. Browning Jeffries, Shareholder Access to Corporate Books and Records: The
Abrogation Debate, DRAKE L. REV. 1087, 1093 (2011).
3. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa i( SA M~fT' iu ) [Company
Law of the People's Republic of China], Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27,
2005 (effective Jan. 1, 2006) [hereinafter 2005 PRC Company Law]. The law underwent
major changes in 2005, and relatively minor changes in 1999, 2004, 2013 and 2018.
Hence, it is customarily abbreviated as the 2005 Company Law
4. See generally REINER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW:
A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 29-48 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing this issue
in-depth in chapter two: "Agency Problems and Legal Strategies").
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both contexts, shareholder inspection rights can play an important
role in generating relevant information needed for controlling agency
problems, but variations may exist due to institutional differences.
This Article thus aims to compare shareholder inspection rights
in China and the United States, which is mostly represented by
Delaware, the preeminent corporate law jurisdiction in the United
States. In doing so, this Article not only examines the law on the
books but also the law in practice. Part II and Part III provide
detailed discussions of the law and the practice of shareholder
inspection rights in China and Delaware respectively. Part IV
conducts a China-United States comparison of the key aspects of
shareholder inspection rights, and then tries to explain the
similarities and differences between them. It finishes with some brief
conclusions.
II. SHAREHOLDER INSPECTION RIGHTS UNDER CHINESE LAW
A. The Legal Framework
The Chinese regime for shareholder inspection rights can be
traced back to the first national company law of the PRC, namely the
1993 PRC Company Law.5 The relevant provisions therein, however,
were very brief and general, simply stating that the shareholders
have the right to inspect certain materials such as the minutes of the
shareholders' meetings and the financial reports.6 The 1993 Company
Law underwent several minor amendments before it was overhauled
in 2005 and was thus called the 2005 PRC Company Law, which is
still in force today despite some minor revisions thereafter.7 The 2005
PRC Company Law represents a significant improvement over its
1993 predecessor, providing more details on the regime of
shareholder inspection rights.8 However, over the years, even the
2005 PRC Company Law proved to be inadequate in relation to
shareholder inspection rights.
On August 25, 2017, the Supreme People's Court (SPC)
promulgated the long-awaited fourth judicial interpretation on the
2005 Company Law (2017 Judicial Interpretation), which went into
effect on September 1, 2017. 9 A total of six provisions in this
5. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa ( A iI )[Company
Law of the People's Republic of China], Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29,
1993 (effective July 1, 1994) [hereinafter 1993 PRC Company Law].
6. Id. at art. 32, 110.
7. 2005 PRC Company Law, supra note 3.
8. Id. at arts. 33, 97.
9. Zuigaorenminfayuan Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Renming Gongsifa Rogan
Wenti De Guiding Si( iAJi TiitW1 XA 1 ) fMi@Ji
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instrument are devoted to inspection rights litigation, providing more
guidance on how the cases should be brought and heard.1 0 The key
features of shareholder inspection rights under the Chinese law are
summarized below.
First, shareholder inspection rights are regulated differently
according to the type of companies concerned. There are two main
types of companies allowed under the Chinese company law, namely
the limited liability companies (LLC) and the joint stock limited
companies (JSC).1 1 The 2005 PRC Company Law as last amended in
2018 sets out two provisions, namely §3312 and §97,13 to stipulate
shareholder inspection rights in the context of LLCs and JSCs
separately.
Second, there are no statutory restrictions on the eligibility of
the shareholder to exercise inspection rights, such as the
requirements of a minimum shareholding level and specified holding
period. According to the 2017 Judicial Interpretation, if a shareholder
of a company files for inspection rights under §33 or §97 of the 2005
PRC Company Law, the court should accept the case.
14 But if the
(I)L)) [The Fourth Judicial Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Various
Issues Concerning the Application of the PRC Company Law], Aug. 25, 2017 (effective
Sept. 1, 2017) [hereinafter 2017 Judicial Interpretation]. In China, the judicial
interpretation as issued by the SPC carries the force of law.
10. Id. at §§7-12.
11. From a comparative law perspective, the Chinese LLC is broadly similar to
the close corporation in the US or the private company in British Commonwealth
jurisdictions, while the JSC corresponds to the publicly held corporation or the public
company in the Anglo-American world. Internationally, the term "corporation" in the
US is the counterpart of the term "company" commonly used in many British
Commonwealth jurisdictions as well as in China. For convenience, the two terms are
used interchangeably in this paper, unless specifically indicated
12. This provision states that: "A shareholder shall have the right to review
and duplicate the company's articles of association, the minutes of the meetings of
the shareholders assembly, the resolutions of the board of directors, the
resolutions of the board of supervisors, as well as the financial and accounting
reports of the company. A shareholder may request to consult the accounting
books of the company. To do that, the shareholder shall submit a written request
to the company and explain his purposes. Where the company deems, on
reasonable grounds, that it is for illegitimate purposes that the shareholder
requests to consult its accounting books, which may damage the lawful interests of
the company, the company may refuse to provide its accounting books to the
shareholder to consult, and shall, within 15 days from the date the shareholder
submits the written request, give a written reply to the shareholder and state its
reasons. Where the company refuses to provide its accounting books, the
shareholder may request the people's court to demand the company to provide
such books." 2005 PRC Company Law, supra note 3, at art. 33.
13. This provision states that: "Shareholders shall have the right to consult the
company's articles of association, the roster of the shareholders, the stubs of corporate
bonds, the minutes of the meetings of the shareholder assembly, the resolutions
adopted at the meetings of the board of directors and of the board of supervisors, and
the financial and accounting reports, and shall have the right to put forward proposals
or raise questions about the business operation of the company." Id. at art. 97.
14. 2017 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 9, at§ 7.
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company produces evidence that the plaintiff does not have the status
of shareholder at the time of pleading, the court should dismiss the
case. There is an exception, however, under which if a former
shareholder can produce prima facie evidence that their interests
were harmed at the time when they held shares, they also have the
right to inspect relevant materials falling within their shareholding
period.15
Third, the materials subject to inspection rights are divided into
different categories. The first category consists of the company's
bylaws, the minutes of the shareholders' meetings, the resolutions of
the board of directors' meetings, the resolutions of the board of
supervisors' meetings, as well as the financial reports.1 6 The second
category is the accounting books of the company.1 7 Ambiguity may
arise here as to whether the term "accounting books" includes
original accounting vouchers and whether the inspection right can
extend to other materials not listed in the law, such as contracts. For
the purpose of this Article, original accounting vouchers and other
materials are treated as belonging to the third and fourth categories
of materials discussed in the text above, respectively.
For LLCs, the shareholder can request both the first and second
categories of materials. is By contrast, only the first category of
materials is explicitly provided for the shareholders of JSCs.19
However, there are two additional items listed for JSC shareholders,
namely the stock ledger and the stubs of corporate bonds, which are
not available to LLC owners.2 0
Fourth, a bifurcated approach is taken to setting out the
prerequisites for exercising inspection rights, depending on what
category of materials the shareholder is trying to access. Basically, for
the first category of materials, access is more liberal without any
explicit prerequisites laid down in the law.21 In contrast, as the
second category of materials is more sensitive, there are both
15. Id.
16. 2005 PRC Company Law, supra note 3, at §1, arts. 33, 97.
17. Id.
18. 2005 PRC Company Law, supra note 3, art. 33.
19. Presumably, as many JSCs are listed companies and thus are required to
publicly disclose accounting information, there is usually little need to resort to
inspection rights litigation to get these documents.
20. The stubs of corporate bonds are the original record of the bonds that the
company has issued, and a shareholder would want to inspect them to verify the
truthfulness of the corporate bonds. In China, only JSCs can issue corporate bonds,
hence the right to inspect the stubs is only provided to JSC owners For the stock
ledger, it is generally unnecessary to seek it in the context of LLCs where the number
of shareholders is normally small and shareholders tend to know each other well. In
any event, the shareholder register of LLCs can he readily available from the company
registrar and there is little need for inspection rights litigation.
21. 2005 PRC Company Law, supra note 3, at art. 33.
912 [VOL, 53:907
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procedural and substantive restrictions. To start with, the
shareholder needs to submit a written request for this type of
information, which shall state a proper purpose.22 Then, if the
company has legitimate reasons to believe that the shareholder's
request for inspecting the accounting books is for an improper
purpose and may impair the legitimate interests of the company, it
may reject the request of the shareholder to inspect the books.2 3 If the
company chooses to reject the request, it must do so within fifteen
days after the shareholder submits a written request, and give the
shareholder a written reply to explain the rejection.2 4 Finally, once
the company refuses the shareholder's request, the shareholder may
apply to the appropriate court for an order compelling production. 2 5 If
the court supports the shareholder's request, the judgment should
clearly specify what materials the shareholder can inspect as well as
when and where to inspect those materials.26
The difficult and perennial question here is what constitutes an
"improper purpose" on the part of the requesting shareholder. The
2017 Judicial Interpretation sheds some light on this issue,
enumerating four circumstances where an improper purpose may be
found.27 The first three circumstances are specific, while the fourth is
a catch-all provision.2 8
Finally, several other rules are designed to strike a balance
between protecting legitimate use of and preventing abuse of
shareholder inspection rights. For example, a shareholder cannot be
substantially deprived of their inspection rights by the company's
bylaws or any agreement between shareholders.29 Further, if a
director or a senior executive of a company fails to perform duties in
making or preserving the company's documents and materials
covered within the shareholder inspection rights, and this act causes





26. 2017 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 9, at § 10.
27. Id. at § 8.
28. Id. This provision states that: "(1) The shareholder is engaged in any
business in substantial competition with the main business of the company for the
shareholders own account or on behalf of any other person, except as otherwise
specified by the company's bylaws or agreed upon by all shareholders. (2) The
shareholder's consultation of the company's accounting books for the information of any
other person may damage the company's lawful interests. (3) During the three years
before the day when the shareholder files a request with the company for consultation
of accounting books, the shareholder once consulted the company's accounting books for
the information of any other person, causing damage to the company's lawful interests.
(4) Any other circumstances showing that the shareholder has an illicit purpose." Id.
29. Id. at § 9.
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liable to compensate the shareholder.3 0 However, ifa shareholder of a
company divulges any trade secret of the company it learned of from
exercising its inspection right, and this disclosure causes damage to
the company's lawful interests, then the shareholder can be held
liable to compensate for the relevant losses suffered by the
company.31
Although China has gradually set up a relatively complete legal
framework for shareholder inspection rights, there are still many
unanswered questions. For instance, can the inspection right be
exercised by a beneficial owner whose shares are held in a voting
trust or by a nominee on their behalf? What is the full extent of the
materials that can be inspected? What is the content of the "improper
purpose" restriction? What is meant by a substantial deprivation of
the shareholder's inspection right? To shed light on how the
shareholder inspection right has been exercised in China, this Article
conducts an empirical study of how courts have treated inspection
right cases.
B. Empirical Inquiry on Chinese Inspection Rights
1. Overview
How is China's inspection rights regime applied in practice? To
answer this question, this Article examines all inspection cases across
the country for a roughly six-year period of January 1, 2012, to
August 31, 2017.32 This Article uses an authoritative and widely used
electronic database for Chinese law, Be Da Fa Ba, 33employing
search terms based on the relevant legislative provisions.
30. Id. at § 12.
31. Id. at § 11.
32. Ideally, because the 2017 Judicial Interpretation became effective on 1
September 2017, we would like to examine cases before and after this event separately.
Unfortunately, the 2017 Judicial Interpretation has been in effect for a very short
period of time, so we will need to wait for more data to assess its effect. Hence, our
empirical analysis is focused on the cases filed before it took effect.
33. Bei Da Fa Bo, CHINA LAw INFO, http://Chinalawinfo.com (last visited Jan.
22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/5B88-F3DY] (archived Feb. 16, 2020).
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As illustrated in Table Cl, the number of cases has increased
steadily and significantly over the years. A total of 7545 cases were
found over the six-year period of 2012 to 2017. Geographically, in
untabulated data, this Article finds that Jiangsu Province had the
most cases (1048), followed by Shanghai (895), Guangdong province
(634), Zhejiang province (548), and Beijing (518), all of which are
considered to be economically developed regions in China.
In order to reduce the number of cases to a more manageable
volume for analysis, this Article uses a random sampling to extract a
sample of 193 cases.36 These cases are used for the rest of the
empirical inquiry in this Article.
2. The Hearing Time Length
Table C2 provides information on the number of days between
the date of the initial court filing and the date of the final judgment.
34. All the tables on the Chinese cases have a prefix code of"C" (China).
35. It should be noted that in Table CL, the number of cases in 2017 means the
cases in the whole year of 2017, because the purpose of Table C1 is to compare the
number of cases on a yearly basis. As noted in the text above, however, the study
period of our research ends on August 31, 2017, so the year of 2017 mentioned in the
empirical data in the tables below means the period from January 2017 to August
2017, unless otherwise indicated.
36. There is an empirical study published in 2013 on China's inspection rights
cases which randomly selected a sample of 192 cases out of all cases adjudicated from
2006 to 2011 across China. See Jianwei Li, Research on Shareholder Inspection Rights
Litigation, 2 ZHONGOUO FAXUE [CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE] 83 (2013). Our study chooses a
more recent research period of 2012 to 2017 when China's inspection rights regime has
become more mature, using a random sampling exercise to get a similar-sized sample
of 193 cases. For more information on the random sampling methodology and a
comparison of our study findings with those of other earlier studies, see Robin Hui
Huang, Shareholder Inspection Rights in China: An Empirical Inquiry (2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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In China, a civil case should normally be closed within six months of
its filing date, and a six-month extension is available in special
circumstances and upon the approval of the president of the court.3 7
Further extension is possible with the approval of the next higher
court.3 8 These limits have a strong effect on the time for resolving
inspection cases.
Table C2 shows that during the whole period of 2012 to 2017, the
mean delay is around 101.46 days (around 3.38 months), while the
median delay is roughly 81 days (2.7 months). The mean and median
of the number of days taken to close an inspection case in China are
both six months, illustrating that the Chinese courts tended to
adjudicate these cases quite quickly.
The authors also conducted a longitudinal study of whether there
is any change in the time length of the case over the years. It seems
that apart from 2012 and 2017, the mean and median of the number
of days taken to close an inspection case are relatively stable.
Table C2: Number of Days between Court Filing and Final
Outcome
Year Mean Standard Mini Median Maximum
deviation mum
2017 135.708 106.41 14 111.5 408
2016 70.933 40.259 13 72 175
2015 103.04 70.639 18 82 248
2014 94.913 56.991 25 69 354
2013 112.833 71.899 25 114.5 195
2012 91.333 42.730 51 86 170
Total 101.46 77.091 13 81 408
3. The Shareholding Levels of Plaintiff Shareholders
In China, the shareholders have varying governance powers,
depending on their shareholding levels, which may impact their use
of inspection rights. To understand this point, it is useful to first
briefly discuss these powers. To begin with, shareholders individually,
or collectively, holding 3 percent or more of the shares of the company
have the power to put forward an interim proposal at the
37. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susongfa [Civil Procedure Law of the
People's Republic of China] art. 135, President of the People's Republic of China, Apr. 9,
1991 (amended 2007, 2012, and 2017) (effective June 27, 2017).
38. Id.
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shareholders' assembly for discussion. 3Second, the shareholders
separately, or collectively, holding 10 percent or more of the shares of
the company can ask for an interim shareholders' assembly session to
be held.40 Further, shareholders that hold 10 percent or more of the
voting rights are empowered to ask the people's court to dissolve the
company if the company's operations result in heavy losses for the
shareholders and its problems cannot be solved by any other means.4
Third, under the Chinese law, the shareholders individually, or in the
aggregate, holding 30 percent or more of shares are considered to be
controlling shareholders.4 2
Table C3 displays data on plaintiffs' shareholding percentage for
our sample. The bulk of cases are brought by shareholders holding
between 10 percent and 30 percent. In other words, inspection right
suits provide a remedy mainly for minority shareholders.
It is worth noting that up to ten of the 193 cases were filed by
plaintiffs holding 50 percent or more of their company's shares. This
is surprising because those shareholders presumably had control over
their companies and there should be no need for them to resort to
inspection right suits to get relevant information. Upon closer
examination, these ten cases share a common feature that ownership
and management of the company are relatively separated, that is, the
minority shareholder is the legal representative and executive
director of the company, while the majority shareholder acts as a
supervisor or sometimes has no management position.
4 3
When a majority-minority shareholder conflict arises, the
majority may not easily solve the issue through the exercise of its
voting power.4 4 For one thing, the position of legal representative has
important power to represent the company to sign contracts and
bring suits, and can only be removed by a special resolution of the
shareholders' meeting, which requires approval by two-thirds or more
39. 2005 PRC Company Law, supra note 3, at art. 102. Under the Chinese
company law, the shareholders' meeting in JSCs is called the shareholders' assembly.
Id.
40. Id. at art. 100(3).
41. Id. at art. 182.
42. Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Zhenquan Fa [Securities Law of the People's
Republic of China] §65, Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1998 (amended
2004, 2005, 2013, 2014, and 2019) (effective July 1, 1999).
43. See, e.g, Liu Ye v. Shanghai Xinxin Gongmao Co., Qing Min Er (Shang) Chu
Zi No. 163 (Shanghai Municipality Qingpu Dist. Ct. 2014); Chen Fuqian v. Tianjin
Minchuang Jiancai Shichang Co., Chen Min Chu Zi No. 3128 (Tianjin Municipality
Beicheng Dist. Ct. 2014); Zhongshang Zichan Pinggu Co v. Luo Donghao (Appeal),
Chang Min Si Zhong Zi No. 175 (Jilin Province Changchun City Intermediate Ct.
2015).
44. For the same reason, derivative actions have also been found to be brought
by majority shareholders in China. See Robin Hui Huang, Shareholder Derivative
Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis, 27 BANIGNG & FIN.
L.REV. 619, 634 n.54 (2012) [hereinafter Huang, Derivative Litigation].
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of the voting rights,4 5 In most of the cases, the majority shareholder
held more than half but less than two-thirds of voting powers.
Further, directors usually serve a term of three years and can be
reelected.4 6 Finally, in practice, even if the majority shareholder may
succeed in exercising its voting power to change the legal
representative or executive director, the former legal representative
or executive director (the minority shareholder) may refuse to hand
over company seals and documents. Hence, the majority shareholder
may have to bring inspection right suits to obtain relevant
information.
Table C3: What Was the Plaintiffs Shareholding Level?
Shareholding level Number Percentage
Less than 3% 16 8.21%
More than 3% and less than 18 9.23%o
10%
More than 1000and less than 58 29.74%
30% ______________
More than 30% and less than 42 21.38%
50%
More than 50% 10 5.13%
Not clear 51 26.15%
Total 193 100%
4. The Features of Defendant Companies
Table C4 presents information on the types of defendant
companies involved in the sample cases. Only four of the defendant
companies are JSCs; the rest are overwhelmingly LLCs. 47 In addition,
there are a small number of other types of business entities such as
joint ventures and even private schools.4 8
45. 2005 PRC Company Law, supra note 3, at art 43.
46. Id. at art. 45.
47. Most of the JSCs concerned here were not listed on the two national stock
exchanges, namely the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange,
but rather on regional stock exchanges such as the Tianjing Equity Exchange. See, e.g.,
Huang Tianyi v. Hubei Wudang Liquor Co., E Danjiangkou Min Chu Zi No. 01768
(Hubei Province Danjiangkou City Ct. 2014).
48. See, e.g., Shanghai Jiahua Enterprise Ltd. v. Shanghai Jiahua Continuing
Education School, Shanghai Municipality 1st Intermediate Ct. (2016). This case was
included in Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbo [Supreme People's Court Gazette] 2 (2019),
holding that although private schools do not take the company form in China, their
organizers can bring inspection right suits in a way by analogy with the company law.
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Why are there so few inspection right suits for JSCs? For one
thing, the JSCs, particularly those that are listed companies, have a
heightened level of disclosure duties because they are subject to the
securities law, making it unnecessary for their shareholders to resort
to inspection right suits. Moreover, as discussed in subpart IIA,
unlike LLC shareholders, JSC shareholders are not empowered to
inspect company accounting books under the Chinese company law.
Further, JSC shareholders can inspect, but are not allowed to copy,
the relevant company documents without filing an inspection suit.
Table C4: What Was the Type of the Defendant Company?





Table C5 shows that very few defendants were State Owned
Enterprises (SOEs). One possible reason why it can be harder to gain
access to nonpublic information of SOEs is that it can be considered
by the court to be too politically sensitive.






5. The Types of Materials Requested for Inspection
Table C6 examines what information the plaintiffs asked for in
their inspection suits and whether their requests were approved by
the court. As discussed earlier, the information requested can be
broadly divided into four categories. In practice, the plaintiffs usually
request documents from more than one category in a case, which
explains why the total number of entries in Table C6 is significantly
higher than the number of inspection right suits in the sample. In
adjudicating the case, the court will look at the multiple requests
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separately and make d cisions accordingly. This Article calculates the
rate of support for each category separately.
Table C6: What Materials Were Requested?
Types of Number Percent Appro Not Appro
Materials age ved by appr val
requested Court oved rate
for
inspection


















Total 481 100% 346 135 71.93%
As Table C6 shows, for the 193 sample cases, there are 481 total
information requests. Within the four categories of information
requested, the second category (accounting books) was most
frequently requested (35.76 percent), closely followed by the first
category (34. 10 percent). The fourth category was requested the least
(7.48 percent).
Out of the total 481 requests, 346 requests were approved by the
court, making the average approval rate 71.93 percent. However, this
rate varies greatly amongst thedifferent categories ofinformation.
Not surprisingly, the first category has the highest support rate
(85.98 percent), since it isclearly allowed under Article 33 for LLCs
and Article 97 for JSCs. The major reason for rejecting arequest for
the first category of information is that the plaintiffs were found not
to bethe shareholders of the defendants.
The second category of information gets the second-highest
support rate (76.74 percent). Again, Article 33 clearly allows access to
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the second category of information, but there is a procedural
prerequisite, that is, the plaintiff should send a prior written request
to the company. In some cases, the plaintiff shareholder lost simply
because they failed to satisfy this procedural requirement.
The support rate of the third category of information is also quite
high (62.39 percent). In general, the courts consider original
accounting vouchers to be covered under inspection right provisions.
The failure of the plaintiff shareholders in those unsupported suits is
usually either due to their lack of shareholder status or because they
did not fulfill the procedural prerequisite as noted above. In contrast,
the request for the fourth category of information was seldom
supported (13.89 percent), as the courts generally consider it to fall
outside the scope of the inspection right provisions.
6. The "Improper Purpose" Defense
Table C7 illustrates how the defense of improper purpose has
been used by the defendant company in certain inspection right suits.
Overall, the improper purpose defense was raised in fifty-nine cases,
representing 30.57 percent of all cases. As discussed earlier, the 2017
Judicial Interpretation provides guidance on the meaning of improper
purpose by listing four types of improper purposes.4 9 Amongst the
three specific types of improper purposes enumerated therein, the
first type was most frequently raised (32.76 percent), while there is
no case raised about the second type, and only one case claimed to be
of the third type.
As the fourth type is a catch-all category of "other
circumstances," this Article further divides this group into four
subcategories used by the defendant company in some sample cases.
The first subcategory was very general and was raised in twenty-nine
cases, accounting for almost half of all cases.
Table C7: What Improper Purposes Were Claimed by
Defendants as Defenses to Requests for Accounting Books?
49. 2017 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 9, at§ 8
Typesof Number Percent Approv Not Appr
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the
company
There is 4 6.78% 0 4 0
improper
purpose







Total 59 100% 1 58 1.69%
Note that the defendant company was successful with this
defense in only one case. There are several possible reasons for this
lack of success. First, it is very difficult for the defendant company to
establish an improper purpose on the part of the plaintiff shareholder
The only successful case is Jianghan vs. Qichang Xingli Haimen
Railway Materials Ltd, where the defendant company proved that the
plaintiff shareholder was involved in another company that had the
same business and the same target clients as the defendant company
so that the first specific type of improper purpose applied.5 0 Generally,
if the plaintiff shareholder engages in a business which is not the
same as the defendant company, the court is unlikely to find that the
first specific type of improper purpose applies.5 1
Furthermore, for the catch-all provision, this Article finds that
the defendant company just makes a general claim without giving
concrete evidence. This helps explain why all of them were not
approved by the court. Finally, before the promulgation of the 2017
Judicial Interpretation, it was less clear what might constitute
improper purposes, and sometimes, the court did not even find an
improper purpose when the requesting shareholder is engaged in a
business in substantial competition with the main business of the
50, Jianghan v. Qichang Xingli Haimen Ry. Materials Ltd., Su 0684 Min Chu
No. 1029 (Jiangsu Province Haimen City Ct. 2016).
51. See, e.g, Zhang Zhenping v. Beijing Heshi Lianchuang Culture Promotion
Ltd., Jing 0114 Min Chu No. 12911 (Beijing Municipality Changping Dist. Ct. 2017). In
this case, the defendant claimed that the shareholder was engaged in a business in
substantial competition with the main business of the company, but the court rejected
it because evidence showed that plaintiff shareholder's spouse ran a company whose
business scope only overlapped partly with the defendant company.
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company. 52 The new statute should change this once it is fully
implemented.
7. Substantial Deprivation of Inspection Rights
As discussed earlier, it is stipulated in China that a shareholder
of a company cannot be substantially deprived of their inspection
rights by the company's bylaws or any agreement between
shareholders. 3Table C8 shows how the "substantial deprivation"
rule has been applied. Out of the total 193 sample cases, defendants
raised the substantial deprivation issue in only three cases, only one
of which found it to have occurred. The inference to be drawn here is
that companies rarely restrict the shareholders' inspection right
through their bylaws or in a shareholders' agreement in China.
Finally, it is important to note that the restrictions in dispute are
mainly based on the confidentiality issue, and thus are functionally
similar to the defense of improper purpose, which also includes
leaking information to others.
Table C8: Frequency Distribution of Circumstances of
Substantial Deprivation
Forms of Number Percen Not Substa
disputed ofcases tage substantial ntial
substantial deprivation depriv
deprivation ation
Company 33.33% 1 0
constitution
52. See, e.g., Yang Jianbing & Ma Haoran v. Jiangsu Province Huaian City
Guoyuan Taxation Firm, Pu Shang Chu Zi No. 00513 (Jiangsu Province Huaian City
Qingpu Dist, Ct. 2015). In this case, the plaintiff shareholders left the company and
joined another company in the same business. The court held that the non-competition
rule applied to directors and not shareholders under the Chinese law, and that there
was no evidence to suggest improper purposes on the part of plaintiff shareholders.
Had the case occurred after the 2017 Judicial Interpretation, the mere fact of plaintiff
shareholders engaging in business competition could suffice to find improper purposes.
53. 2017 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 9, at § 9.
54. Wujing v. Nanjing Xinliansheng Ltd., Xi Shang Chu Zi No. 286 (Jiangsu
Province Nanjing City Xixia Dist. Ct. 2013). In this case, the company's bylawrequired
that the shareholder should make a written request and a confidentiality commitment
before exercising the inspection right. Under the bylaw, the company could also refuse
the inspection request of the shareholder who has leaked the company's ecrets before.
The court held that the restrictions in the bylaw were reasonable and did not constitute
substantive deprivation.
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Total 3 10000 2 1
8. Subsequent Cases
Table C9 presents the information on "subsequent cases,"
namely the cases filed by the same plaintiffs against the same
defendants after the inspection right cases. The purpose here is to
find out whether the inspection right cases in China were filed by the
plaintiffs as a tool to investigate the company and to collect relevant
evidence to bring subsequent cases.
Table C9: Subsequent Cases Filed
Year Sam Sub Clas Deriv Appra Liqui Othe
ple seq s ative isal datio r
case uen acti suits suits n suits
s t on suits
suit
s
2017 40 1 0 0 0 0 1
2016 52 8 0 0 1 5 2
2015 47 11 0 0 3 3 5
2014 37 3 0 0 1 2 0
2013 9 0 0 0 0 0 0
2012 8 1 0 0 1 0 0
Tota 193 24 0 0 6 10 8
1
55. Yang Jianbing & Ma Haoran v. Jiangsu Province Huaian City Guoyuan
Taxation Firm, Pu Shang ChuZi No. 00513 (Jiangsu Province Huaian City Qingpu
Dist. Ct. 2015). In this case, the company's bylaw provided that the company can
disallow a shareholder to exercise the inspection rights for the purpose of protecting its
business secrets. The court did not hold this to be invalid, but nevertheless ordered the
defendant company to provide information because it failed to produce evidence that
the plaintiffs' request for information was for improper purposes.
56. Jiang Xuyang v. Sichuan Rongyi Holding Ltd., Chuan 0191 Min Chu No.
4142 (Sichuan Province Chengdu City High-Tech Development Dist. Ct. 2017). In this
case, the defendant company passed a shareholder resolution that because the
requesting shareholder was involved in another case against the company, he would
lose his inspection rights. The court found this shareholder resolution to constitute
"substantial deprivation," holding that "the shareholders' inspection rights are the
inherent rights of the shareholders, and should not be restricted through shareholder
agreements or other means." Id.
156
9252020]
VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
As Table C9 shows, during the study period, the subsequent suit
rate varied from year to year. Overall, there were twenty-four
subsequent suits in relation to the 193 sampled cases, with the
subsequent suit rate being 12.4 percent. Further, this Article groups
subsequent suits into four categories, namely derivative suits,
appraisal suits, liquidation suits, and other suits which are mainly
related to disputes over validity of shareholders' resolutions,
distribution of dividend, and capital contribution by shareholders. In
stark contrast with the United States, derivative suits and class
actions are not found in China.5 7 There were up to ten liquidation
suits and six appraisal suits, representing 41.7 percent and 25
percent of all subsequent suits, respectively.
Ill. SHAREHOLDER INSPECTION RIGHTS UNDER DELAWARE LAW 5 8
A. Overview
Under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL), shareholders have a mandatory right to seek stocklists or
books and records. 59 The information available for inspection is
extensive and includes "documents relating to allegedly wrongful
transactions."6 0 This right is so central to shareholder ownership that
it cannot be removed by amending the corporation's charter. 61
However, this right is not absolute, and questions of standing and
proper purpose limit the abilities of a shareholder to demand
documents.6 2
First, to have standing to demand inspection of corporate records,
a stockholder must either be a holder of the record or the beneficial
owner of the stock (i.e., a voting trustee).6 3 While the courts are
57. This issue will be further discussed and explained later. See infra Part IVC.
58. All of the tables in this section are taken from James D. Cox, Kenneth J.
Martin & Randall S. Thomas, The Paradox of Delawares "Tools at Hand" Doctrine: An
EmpiricalInvestigation, BUS. LAW. (forthcoming summer 2020).
59. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West 2010).
60. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Using State Inspection Statutes for
Discovery in Federal Securities Fraud Actions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 69, 84 (1997). Other
examples include "corporate accounting records; minutes of all meetings of the
shareholders, hoard of directors, and board committees; stocklist materials; the
corporation's certificate of incorporation' corporate bylaws; written communications to
shareholders; and copies of resolutions creating one or more classes of stock." Id. at 72
n.11.
61. Cedarview Opportunities Master Fund v. Spanish Broad. Sys. Inc., No.
2017-0785-ABD, 2018 WL 4057012, at *53-55 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2018),
62. Tit. 8, §§220(c)(1)-(c)(3).
63. Id. at § 220(a)(1). If the stockholder is a beneficial owner or an attorney or
agent of the stockholder, proper documentation is required. DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. &
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generally lenient in regards to standing, plaintiffs who have already
cashed out or exchanged their shares in a merger may not have
standing.6 4 Second, shareholders bear the burden of "demonstrat[ing]
a proper purpose for making such a demand."6 5 Section 220 defines a
"proper purpose" as "a purpose reasonably related to such person's
interest as a stockholder."6 6 Case law has established a long lst
6 7 of
proper purposes including: (1) investigating corporate
mismanagement; 6 8(2) ascertaining the value of stock;69 (3) soliciting
support for derivative action;7 0 (4) investigating the independence of
special litigation committees; and (5) communicating with other
stockholders in order to effectuate management policy changes.72
However, the Court of Chancery has discretion to refuse demands
that it finds to have an improper purpose.7 3 Thus, in Norfolk County
Retirement System v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., the court noted that
the primary purpose of the request 'must not be adverse to the
corporation's best interest."7 4
MICHAEL A. PITTENGER, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN DELAWARE COURT
OF CHANCERY § 9.07[a][2][i][B] (2d ed. 2018).
64. See Weingarten v. Monster Worldwide, Inc., No. 12931-VCG, 2017 WL
752179, at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2017) (dismissing the case for lack of standing because
the plaintiff was no longer a shareholder at the time the challenged merger took place).
For further discussion on standing, see WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 63, at §
9.07[b].
65. King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1145 (Del. 2011).
66. Tit. 8, §220(b).
67. For more on established proper purposes, see EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL.,
FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW §220.05 (6th ed. 2014); WOLFE
& PITTENGER, supra note 63, at § 9.07[e][1l.
68. See Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A2d 563, 567 (Del.
1997) ("It is well established that investigation of [corporate] mismanagement is a
proper purpose for a § 220 books and records inspection.") (alteration in original).
69. CM & M Grp., Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 792 (Del. 1982) (citing State ex
rel Rogers v. Sherman Oil Co., 117 A. 122, 125 (Del. 1922); State ex rel Brumley v.
Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 77 A.2d 16, 20 (Del. 1910)).
70. See State ex rel Bloch v. Sentry Safety Control Corp., 24 A2d 587, 590 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1942); State ex rel. Foster v. Standard Oil Co. of Kansas, 18 A.2d 235, 238
(Del. Super. Ct. 1941); Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Horton, 631 A.2d 1 (Del. 1993)
(holding that a shareholders request to inspect a corporation's stock ledger with the
purpose of identifying other shareholders who may be interested was a proper purpose
under the statutory requirements).
71. Grimes v. DSC Comme'ns Corp., 724 A.2d 561, 566 (Del. Ch. 1998); La.
Mun. Police Emp's. Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 5682-VCL, 2011 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 42, at*1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011).
72. See Marathon Partners L.P. v. M&F Worldwide Corp., No. 018-N, 2004 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 101, at *30 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2014) (holding that communicating with other
shareholders in order to effect a change in management policies is a "proper purpose"
for a shareholder's demand to inspect corporate records).
73. See State ex ret. Healy v. Superior Oil Corp., 13 A.2d 453, 456 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1940).
74. Norfolk Cty. Ret. Sys. v. Joseph A. Bank Clothiers Inc., No. 3443-VCP, 2009
Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, at *16 (Del. Ch Feb. 12, 2009) (citing Grimes v. DSC Commc'ns
Corp., 724 A.2d 561, 565 (Del. Ch. 1998)).
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If a shareholder's books and records request is denied or ignored,
the shareholder may, after five days, bring a claim against the
corporation in the Court of Chancery.7 5 When demanding books and
records, the requesting shareholder bears the burden of
demonstrating a proper purpose for their request.7 6 As a Section 220
action is essentially a tool for the shareholder to gather information of
potential wrongdoing, 7 the shareholder need only demonstrate
evidence that there is a credible basis of possible mismanagement
warranting further investigation. 7 8 This standard carries "the lowest
possible burden of proof' 7 to enable plaintiffs that may lack
sufficient evidence to bring a claim directly to make requests that
may lead to additional discovery of potential management
wrongdoing.
However, despite this light burden of proof, the Delaware courts
have understood the inspection rights to be a balancing act between
the rights of stockholders and the corporation. First, the Delaware
courts have stated that the credible basis standard does not allow for
"fishing expeditions." 8 0 Second, even when a plaintiffs Section 220
action is successful, her inspection rights are limited to those
documents that are "necessary and essential" to achieving her stated
purpose. 81 Furthermore, a stockholder's inspection right does not
75. DEL. CODE ANN. § 220(c) (West 2010).
76. Thomas & Martin, supra note 60, at 85.
77. See Seinfeld v. Verizon Comm'cns, Inc., 909 A2d 117, 118, 123 (Del. 2006)
(emphasis added). A stockholder is "not required to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that waste and [misJmanagement are actually occurring." Stockholders need
only show, by a preponderance of the evidence, a credible basis from which the Court of
Chancery can infer there is possible mismanagement that would warrant further
investigation-a showing that "may ultimately fall well short of demonstrating that
anything wrong occurred." Id. at 123 (alteration in original). The credible basis
requirement thus qualifies by rendering more specific the showing that the shareholder
meets the "proper purpose' requirement set forth in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §220(b)
(West 2010). Some states have followed Delaware in similarly conditioning record
requests on alleging a "credible basis" of misconduct when records are sought as a
possible prelude for a shareholder suit. See, e.g., Arctic Fin.Corp. v. OTR Express Inc.,
38 P.3d 701, 704 (Kan. 2002); Cain v. Merck & Co., 1 A.3d 834, 842-43 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2010) (finding guidance from Delaware to conclude that unsupported
allegations of mismanagement do not present a proper purpose). Other courts adhere
to the more general "proper purpose: standard but closely scrutinize the request for
information supporting the presence of wrongdoing. See, e.g., Chitwood v. Vertex
Pharm., Inc., 71 N.E.3d 492, 501 (Mass. 2017) ("[R]equest granted if there is
'reasonable inference . . . that would tend to indicate the existence of corporate
wrongdoing or mismanagement."').
78. See Norfolk Cty. Ret. Sys., 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, at *17.
79. Id. (quoting Melzer v. CNET Networks, Inc., 934 A.2d 912, 917 n.19 (Del.
Ch. 2007)).
80, Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 122.
81. Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 806 A.2d 113, 115 (Del. 2002) (citation
omitted); see also Helmsman Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. A & S Consultants, Inc., 525 A.2d
160, 167 (Del. Ch. 1987). In addition to stating a proper purpose, a stockholder seeking
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allow it "wide ranging discovery that would be available in support of
litigation."2 Rather "it is restricted to inspection of the books and
records needed to perform the task."8 3 In certain cases, Delaware
courts have further required plaintiffs seeking a Section 220 action to
"make specific and discrete identification, with rifled precision, of the
documents sought."84
In addition to these limitations, the Court of Chancery has broad
discretion in limiting or conditioning an inspection.8 5 One limiting
factor requires that the books and records "address the 'crux of the
shareholder's purpose' and that the information 'is unavailable from
another source."' 86 Furthermore, in some cases, when nonpublic
information is sought,87 the Delaware courts have upheld as
reasonable defendants' requests that a stockholder sign a
confidentiality agreement.8 8 Documents obtained under a Section 220
action that are subject to a confidentiality agreement "will be treated
as confidential unless and until disclosed in the course of litigation or
pursuant to some other legal requirement."
8 9
a Section 220 inspection must satisfy certain form and manner requirements outlined
in the statute See West Coast Mgmt. &Capital, LLC v Carrier Access Corp., 914 A.2d
636, 641 (Del. Ch. 2006) (citing Highland SelectEquity Fund, L.P. v. Motient Corp.,
906 A.2d 156, 163 (Del.Ch. 2006)) For example, a stockholder is required to serve a
"written demand under oath stating the purpose thereof ... directed to the corporation
at its registered office in [Delaware] or at its principal place of business." Tit. 8, §
220(b). If the corporation refuses to permit the demanded inspection or fails to respond
"to the demand within 5 business days after the demand has been made, the
stockholder may apply to the Court of Chancery for an order to compel such
inspection." Id. at § 220(c). When filing a Section 220 complaint, the plaintiff
stockholder is required to attach proof of being a stockholder of record. Id.
82. Saito, 806 A.2d at 114.
83. BBC Acquisition Corp. v. Durr-Fillauer Med., Inc. 623 A,2d 85, 88 (Del. Ch.
1992).
84. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 266 (Del. 2000) (emphasis added).
85. 'it. 8, §220(c). The Court of Chancery's imposition of a condition or
limitation is determined on a "case-by-case and 'fact specific"' basis. United Techs.
Corp. v. Treppel, 109 A.3d 553, 558 (Del. 2014) (quoting Espinoza v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 32 A.3d 365, 372 (Del. 2011)).
86. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Ind. Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund IBEW, 95
A.3d 1264, 1271 (Del. 2014) (quoting Espinoza v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 32 A.3d 365,
372 (Del. 2011).
87. 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS & BSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §7.48 (3d ed. 2018).
88. Disney v. Walt Disney Co., 857 A.2d 444, 447-48 (Del. Ch. 2004).
89. Stone v. Ritter, No. 1570-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 146, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept.
26, 2005); see also Disney. 857 A.2d at 450 ("[A] stockholder making a books and
records demand can expect that documents designated as confidential pursuant to a
reasonable confidential agreement will remain confidential unless the stockholder
concludes that grounds exist to initiate litigation and the court in which the proceeding
is brought determines to include those documents in the public record.").
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B. The Tools at Hand Doctrine
The usefulness of a Section 220 request for books and records as
a discovery tool was not initially apparent to plaintiffs in Delaware.
In the 1980s and 1990s, shareholder plaintiffs rarely utilized the
inspection statute to request books and records. 90 Even when a
Section 220 request was made, the large majority of them were for
stocklists.9 1 Thus, according to an empirical study conducted by one
of the authors, from 1981 to 1994 only fifty-three books and records
cases were filed, while a total of ninety-one stocklist cases were
brought during the same time period.92
But Section 220 can be useful as a prefiling discovery tool by
plaintiffs. To understand how Section 220 acts in this fashion, it is
important to first understand the plaintiff shareholder's problem in
filing breach of fiduciary duty cases. If they suspect management
misconduct, plaintiffs can either bring a class action claim, alleging
indirect injuries to the shareholder, or a derivative claim, alleging
indirect harm to the shareholders due to an injury to the
corporation.9 3 In the case of a derivative lawsuit, as the corporation is
directly injured, a plaintiff is required to first request that the board
bring the action.9 4 The directors then decide whether the corporation
should file a suit against the alleged wrongdoers, who are usually the
very directors themselves. 9 However, in Delaware, if a plaintiff
brings a demand for a derivative suit to the board, she concedes the
board's independence and authority to pursue the action, waiving her
future ability to litigate the claim.9 6
90. Thomas & Martin, supra note 60, at 90.
91. Id. at 90, 102-07. However, the study presented may not accurately reflect
the actual breakdown in Section 220 requests. This is largely because when a demand
is made, companies are incentivized to produce some documents than to reject the
investor's demand, forcing a lawsuit. For a discussion on why companies are
incentivized to accede to shareholder demands, see Kevin Shannon, Corp. Litig.
Partner, Potter Anderson Corroon LLP, Trending Developments: Dealing with Books
and Records Inspection Demands at the Third Annual Symposium on Corporate Law
(Oct. 12, 2018) (oral presentation). Therefore, studies are largely limited to those
Section 220 requests that end up in court.
92. Thomas & Martin, supranote 60, at 102-07.
93. For a more extensive summary of the distinction between a derivative and
direct suit, please see In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholders Litig., 124 A.3d 1025,
1044-52 (Del. Ch. 2015).
94. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141 (West 2010). "When a corporation suffers harm,
the board of directors is the institutional actor legally empowered under Delaware law
to determine what, if any, remedial action the corporation should take, including
pursuing litigation against the individuals involved." In re China Agritech Inc., No.
7163-VCL, 2013 Del.Ch. LEXIS 132, at *36 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013).
95. Delaware accordingly has its own process to review that the directors
actually reviewed whether bringing litigation against the wrongdoing managers was in
the best interest of the corporation.
96. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216,1218-19 (Del. 1996).
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If plaintiffs decide to avoid the demand process, their demand
excusal complaint must show with particularized facts that making
demand on the board is futile. However, under Delaware law,
plaintiffs in a derivative suit are "not entitled to discovery to assist
their compliance with the particularized pleading requirement of
Rule 23.1 in a case of demand refusal."9 8 Therefore, unless the facts
required to meet the pleading requirement are publicly available, the
plaintiffs will probably be unable to bring a derivative suit against
the management.
In Rales v. Blasband, the Delaware Supreme Court,
acknowledging this barrier to discovery, urged derivative plaintiffs to
use their Section 220 inspection rights to uncover corporate
information to meet the particularized facts requirement for demand
excusal.1 0 0 This seminal case provides the basis for shareholders to
employ Section 220, the so-called tools at hand,
0 1 as a form of presuit
discovery. A few years later, in Grimes v. Donald,1 0 2 the Delaware
Supreme Court reiterated the importance of utilizing Section 220 to
establish demand futility. 103 There, the court, finding that the
derivative plaintiff failed to establish futility, dismissed the case and
stated, "[ijf the stockholder cannot plead such assertions consistent
with Chancery Rule 11, after using the 'tools at hand' to obtain the
necessary information before filing a derivative action, then the
stockholder must make a pre-suit demand on the board."
1 0 4
Despite the pleas of the Delaware courts, Section 220's use as a
presuit discovery tool was largely unappreciated by the Delaware
plaintiffs bar until the turn of the century. Finally, the message
seemed to get through. In Brehm v. Eisner, the shareholders claimed
that the Disney board breached its fiduciary duty when it approved
"an extravagant and wasteful" employment contract with Michael
Ovitz and then agreed to a nonfault termination of Ovitz fourteen
months later, which entitled him to a $140 million payout.
0 5 Despite
allegations of misconduct based on publicly available information, the
complaint failed to survive a motion to dismiss, in large part, due to
97. This requires them to show enough to "create a reasonable doubt either
that: (1) a majority of the board is independent for purposes of responding to the
demand or refusing the demand; or (2) the challenged action is protected by the
business judgment rule." Thomas & Martin, supra note 60, at 82.
98. Scatter Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70, 77 (Del. 1997).
99. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993).
100. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984) (explaining that the test
of Chancery Rule 23.1 for demand excusal requires alleging particularized facts).
101. See Rales, 634 A.2d at 934-35 n.10 (explaining that Section 220 can be used
as an information-gathering tool in the derivative context).
102. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996) (en bane).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 248 (Del.2000).
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the discovery stay. 106 On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the
Delaware discovery stay was unfair and made pleading demand
futility impossible.0 7 However, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected
these claims, stating:
Plaintiffs may well have the "tools at hand" to develop the necessary facts for
pleading purposes. For example, plaintiffs may seek relevant books and records
of the corporation under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law,
if they can ultimately bear the burden of showing a proper purpose and make
specific and discrete identification, with rifled precision, of the documents
sought. Further, they must establish that each category of books and records is
essential to the accomplishment of their articulated purpose for the
inspection.ios
The sentiment in Brehm has become a fixture in Delaware
courts. 0 9 In fact, the Court of Chancery has warned that lawyers who
fail to use the presuit discovery tool do so at their own peril.110 Since
then, the use of Section 220 as a presuit discovery tool has
dramatically increased."'
C. Section 220 and Merger Litigation
Prior to 2014, the shareholder-friendly standards in the M&A
context created by Revlon 12 and Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 113
106 Id. at 267.
107. Id. at 266.
108. Id. at 266-67.
109. See, e.g., King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1145 (Del. 2011);
Seinfeld v. Verizon Commens, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 120 (Del. 2006). In Verizon, the
Delaware Supreme Court stated: More than a decade ago, we noted that "[s]uprisingly,
little use has been made of Section 220 as an information-gathering tool in the
derivative [suit] context." Today, however, stockholders who have concerns about
corporate governance are increasingly making a broad array of Section 220 demands.
The rise in books and records litigation is directly attributable to this Court's
encouragement of stockholders, who can show a proper purpose, to use the "tools at
hand" to obtain the necessary information before filing a derivative action. Section 220
is now recognized as "an important part of the corporate governance landscape."
Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 120 (alteration in original). Some commentators have argued that
Section 220 demands are "especially relevant when shareholders in a company assert
what are now commonly referred to as 'Caremark claims."' Frank R. Schirripa &
Daniel B. Rehns, Is the Delaware Section 220 Tango Worth the Wait?, AM. BAR AsS'N
(Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/class-
actions/articles/2017/fall2017-delaware-section-220-tango.html
[https://perma.cc/W9PH-J8AHJ (archived Jan. 31, 2020).
110. See Mizel v. Connelly, No. 16638, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 157, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 2, 1999).
111. Cox, Martin& Thomas, supra note 58, at 28-29tbl.1.
112. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 147 (2004)
("Defendants have had much more trouble under the standards set forth in Relon v.
MacAndrews & Forbes.")-
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incentivized plaintiffs to file mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
lawsuits immediately following announcement of all proposed
deals.114 In this environment, class action suits were filed quickly so
Section 220 litigation could not be completed fast enough to be
useful. 1 15 Over time, the increased filing of frivolous deal suits in
Delaware pressured the Delaware legislature and judiciary to take
action in the M&A sphere. As explained below, the Delaware courts
responded with decisions which helped rein in frivolous deal litigation
and created an environment that encouraged the use of Section 220.
1. Revlon and Corwin
Corwin u. KKR Financial Holdings LLC endorsed the use of
shareholder ratification as a cleansing device to dismiss deal
litigation against directors. 11 6 There the Delaware Supreme Court
found that in an arms-length M&A transaction with no explicit
conflict of interest for directors, a fully informed noncoercive vote of
approval by the disinterested stockholders would lead it to review the
actions of the target's board of directors under the business judgment
rule.117 By making it easier for directors to receive deferential review,
Corwin mitigated the flood of deal litigation.1 1 8
2. Weinberger and MFW
Prior to 2014, in cases ofself-dealing by controlling shareholders,
the courts reviewed the actions of the shareholder under the entire
fairness doctrine.11 9 Most famously applied in Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc.,120 this heightened standard of judicial review made it difficult
for defendants to dismiss cases using pretrial motions. This gave all
shareholder plaintiffs' claims value in the settlement process,
incentivizing plaintiffs to bring even weak cases.12 1
113. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del, 1981).
114. One study found that the vast majority of acquisition -oriented class actions
were filed within three days of public announcement of the deal. See Thompson &
Thomas, supra note 112, at 182-83 thl. 9.
115. See id.
116. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 311 (Del 2015).
117. Id. at 308-09.
118. For a discussion on the significance of Corwin, see James D. Cox & Randall
S Thomas, Delawar's Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in
Delaware Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L.323, 336-40 (2018).
119. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (finding that
the Petitioner must meet the test of intrinsic fairness which "involves both a high
degree of fairness and a shift in the burden of proof.").
120. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 712 (Del. 1981).
121. In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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The Delaware Supreme Court addressed this problem in Kahn v.
M&F Worldwide (MFW).122 There, despite the presence of a typical
self-dealing squeeze out of minority shareholders, the court applied
the business judgment standard.12 3 It justified its decision by relying
on the dual approvals the transaction required from an independent
special committee and from a fully informed, uncoerced majority of
the minority shareholder vote.124
3. Modern Usage of the Tools at Hand
The upshot of this shift towards applying the business judgment
rule meant that the actions of many directors and controlling
shareholders in M&A deals went virtually unreviewed by the
Delaware courts. Since shareholders almost always approve the
deal,1 2 5 litigants generally attack director actions by arguing that the
shareholder vote was not fully informed. When a shareholder litigant
can show that the vote was not fully informed, the courts will apply a
heightened judicial standard. 126 However, in order to survive a
motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must, prior to discovery, plead facts
which sufficiently show that they would be entitled "to recover under
any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of
proof." 127 Only once the plaintiff can identify the deficiency in
disclosure will the burden shift to the defendant.1 2 8 However, it is
extremely difficult for plaintiffs to meet this requirement relying
solely on public information.'2 9 Section 220 has provided an essential
discovery tool for plaintiffs in merger litigation.130
For example, in Appel v. Berkman, the plaintiff was able to
discover the omission of material facts that helped it survive a motion
to dismiss.13 There, the plaintiff challenged the disclosures in a cash
122. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d635 (Del. 2014).
123. Id. at 638.
124. Id. at 644-47.
125. See James D. Cox, Tomas J. Mondino & Randall S. Thomas, Understanding
the (Ir1)Relevance of Shareholder Votes on M&A Deals, 69 DUKE L.J. 503, 511-13 (2019).
126. See id. at 542-44.
127. In re Books-A-Million, Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 11343-VCL, 2016 WL
5874974, at *21 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2016).
128. See In re Solera Holdings, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 11524-CB, 2017 WL
57839, at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2017).
129. The need for pre-filing discovery has been heightened in light of the
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Flood v. Synutra Int'l, Inc.. 195 A.3d 754 (Del.
2018).
130. However, some plaintiffs' counsels have been skeptical about the value of
Section 220 proceedings as a substitute for discovery in an M&A case. See Joel E.
Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using Data Points of Successful
Stockholder Litigation as a Tool for Reform, 72 BUS. LAW. 623, 648 (2017).
131. Appel v. Berkman, No. 12844-VCMR, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 503, at *6 (Del.
Ch. July 13, 2017), rev'd, 180 A.3d 1055, 1064 (Del. 2018). The Chancery Court's
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sale of the company to a private equity firm in a "two-step merger
transaction involving a front-end tender offer followed by a back-end
merger under Section 251(h)." 1 3 2While the transaction was pending,
the plaintiff requested books and records from the company.
1 3 3 Once
the transaction was completed, the company fulfilled the plaintiffs
request.1 34 It was through this request that the plaintiff had the
grounds to plead an omission of material facts-among other things
the company's founder, largest shareholder, and current chairman,
had abstained from approving the transaction. 
1 3 5As a result, the
Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Chancery
Court's decision, holding that the omission was material and
necessary to make the disclosures not misleading.
1 3 6
Similarly, Morrison v. Berry shows the pivotal role a Section 220
books and records request can have in overcoming the "cleansing"
effect of Corwin ratification. 1 3 7 There the information uncovered in an
inspection case allowed plaintiff to file a breach of fiduciary duty
claim against the corporate directors in connection with the sale of
the company to a private equity firm in a friendly tender offer.
1 3 8
While the tender offer was pending, the plaintiff filed a Section 220
action seeking books and records from the company.
1 3 9 The company
refused the plaintiffs request, and the tender offer closed with a
majority of shares tendered. 140 When the plaintiff brought her
Section 220 demand to court, she successfully obtained the requested
documents.14 1
This request uncovered a smoking gun; among other things, an
email revealed that Ray Berry, the company's founder, had already
entered into an agreement to sell to the private equity firm and
intended to thwart sales to other bidders.1 4 2 This was not disclosed to
the shareholders.14 3 The Delaware Supreme Court, finding that the
vote was not fully informed, as information material to a voting
shareholder was not disclosed, reversed and remanded the Chancery
Court's dismissal of the case.14 4
decision that defendants were entitled business judgment rule under Corwin was
reversed by the Delaware Supreme Court.
132. Appel v. Berkman, 180 A.3d 1055, 1057 (Del. 2018).
133. Id. at 1059.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1057.
136. d. at 1064-65.
137. Morrison v. Berry, 191 A.3d 268, 277 (Del. 2018).
138. Id. at 284-85.
139. Id. at 273.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 273-74.
143. Id. at 276-77.
144 Id. at 287.
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Furthermore, Section 220 can play a crucial role in litigating
cases where a controlling shareholder may seek to utilize MFW
protections. An ultimately unsuccessful use of Section 220 can be
seen in Olenik v. Lodzinski, where plaintiffs were able to employ the
tools at hand to obtain information.1 4 5 However, they were ultimately
dismissed as they could still not establish that defendants had made
a material misstatement or omission.146  As illustrated by the cases
above, Section 220 has proven to be an important means for plaintiffs
seeking presuit discovery in an M&A transaction. As shown in the
next Part, the use of this right has increased dramatically since
decision in Brehm.147
D. Empirical Data on the Use of Section 220148
In an earlier paper, one of the authors collected data on all
Section 220 cases filed in the Delaware Chancery Court from 2004-
2018.149 Table D1 provides a description of the Section 220 cases filed
during 2004-2018. There were only eight cases where the plaintiffs
solely sought the stocklist, The vast majority of cases made requests
only for books and records, while a significant number of other cases
asked for both books and records as well as the stocklist. There is
significant variation in the number of cases filed annually, ranging
from a low of twenty-nine to a high of sixty-seven.
Table D1: 1 5 0 Section 220 Filings in Delaware Chancery Court
to Obtain Stockholder List and/or Books and Records
Year Number Stocklist Booksand Bothstocklist
filed ofcases only recordsonly andbooksand
records
2004 49 2 30 17
2005 57 0 37 20
2006 40 3 27 10
145. Olenik v. Lodzinski, No. 2017-0414-JRS, 2018 WL 3493092, at *3-4 (Del.
Ch. July 20, 2018).
146. Id. at *4.
147. See Cox, Martin & Thomas, supra note 58, at 28-29 tbl. 1 (illustrating a
large increase in Section 220 claims between 2004 and 2018).
148. This section draws heavily on an earlier study by one of the authors. Id. at
tbls. 1, 3
149. Id.
150. All the tables on the Delaware law have a prefix code of"D" (Delaware).
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2007 34 0 21 13
2008 33 1 20 12
2009 29 1 23 5
2010 35 1 20 14
2011 38 0 27 11
2012 38 0 31 7
2013 56 0 47 9
2014 67 0 51 16
2015 48 0 39 9
2016 52 0 36 16
2017 61 0 48 13
2018 62 0 53 9
Total 699 8 510 181
It is interesting to contrast these values with those developed in
an earlier study, which compiled similar data for 1981-1994.' Since
that time, there has beena large increase in the number of Section
220 filings. For example, stocklist filings increased substantially from
nine ty-oniecases in the earlier study to 189152iteoercntm
periodl. Even more strikingly, books and records request cases
increased from fifty-three requests in the earlier study to 691
corporate actions in the more recent timeperiod.
1 5 3
What happened in thesecaesIn untabulated results, the more
recent empirical study finds that there are eighty-two court decisions
in the plaintiffs' favor in books and records cases and an additional
151. Thomas &Martin, supra note 60, at 73.
152. This is the sum of stock list only cases plus stock list and books and records
cases.
153. See supra Part 1[I.C (there are an additional 154 LLC/LP cases).
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forty-three settlements where the parties state that the plaintiff is
getting books and records. In thirty-six more cases, the court
dismissed the action without awarding the plaintiff books and records,
and in another twenty-one cases the plaintiff dismissed its case
stating that it was not being given books and records. Summarizing
the publicly available information about outcomes, plaintiffs were
successful 125 times (eighty-two decisions plus forty-three explicitly
productive settlements) and had fifty-seven failures (thirty-six court
dismissals plus twenty-one settlements without documents). The
largest set of cases (465) have indeterminate outcomes because the
plaintiff dismissed its case without clearly indicating that it received
books and records. For this group of cases, it is impossible to classify
them as wins or losses based on publicly available information. Some
experienced Delaware lawyers indicated that in their experience the
plaintiff generally receives some documents in this situation,
although not necessarily all that they request.5 4
Table D2 shows the number of days between the initial court
filing and the final outcome in the case (DELAY), as well as the
number of pages plaintiffs, defendants, and the court filed. DELAY
generally favors defendants because a "subsequent derivative lawsuit
could end up being dismissed on the grounds that other plaintiffs
have already litigated the issue."'5 5 DELAY provides a measure of
how long the plaintiffs are delayed before bringing any subsequent
merits-based litigation. For books and records cases, the mean delay
is around ten months (312 days), while the median delay is
approximately six months (193 days).56
Table D2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Associated with
Request for Books and Records
Standard
Variable Mean deviation Minimum Median Ma
xim
um
DELAY 312 367.01 0 193 2,66
6
154. Some of these settlements are in response to judicial pressure to resolve
cases without unnecessary litigation, while others may arise because the filing of the
Section 220 cases acts as "a shot across the bow," leading the defendant to seek to
resolve the underlying dispute.
155. Michael Greene, Books and Records Disputes Getting Longer, More Complex,
BLOOMBERG BNA (May 5, 2016) (interviewing Megan McIntyre).
156. These values are similar to those obtained in the earlier study. We did not
separately calculate the differences in delay for stock list and books and records cases
in the second study.
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Number of days between complaint filing and
outcome dates.
Number of pages filed by plaintiff.
Number of pages filed by defendant.
Number of pages filed by the court.
Total number of pages filed: plaintiff +
defendant + court.
Percentage of total litigation pages filed by
plaintiff.
Page filings, which provide some indication of the intensity of the
litigation effort by the parties and the court, show some interesting
differences from those compiled in the earlier study. For example,
recent plaintiffs file more than twice as many pages as plaintiffs in
the first study, while recent defendants file almost three times as
much as defendants from the earlier period. This trend is true for
both mean and median filings. The court itself produces a substantial
number of documents with an average of almost forty-six pages,
showing significant court involvement.
These data illustrate one very important point: books and
records cases are not summary proceedings in many instances. The
long case resolution times and the increased level of filing activity for
both plaintiffs and defendants support that finding. Plaintiffs argue
that defendants have turned books and records litigation into
litigation of the possible merits of the suit to shareholders using it as
a quick and easy prefiling discovery tool. 1 5 7 This is true despite the
factthat, "the Court of Chancery has rebuked 'a continuing tendency'
157. At a recent practitioner conference, a leading plaintiffs' lawyer made the
further point that defendants are paid by the hour in books and records cases, whereas
plaintiffs' counsel frequently has to bear its own costs in bringing these cases and is
only compensated for their work if they successfully bring a subsequent merits-based
lawsuit.
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to use asection 220suits for'broad defensive aswellas offensive
purposes. ... "'5
Finally, Table D3 examines how frequently books and records
cases lead to the filing ofa subsequentaction involving the same
defendant corporation, and, if so, whether the case raised derivative
claims, class action claims, individual claims, or other types of claims.
Table D3: Frequency Distribution by Year of Section 220
Cases Where aSubsequent Case Is Filed by Plaintiff
All Clas Receiver
subseq Individ . Appra
uent Derivati Stt ual appoint isal
related ye suits aciactions ment sut
sutsons actions
2004 16 13 6 3 0 0
2005 20 12 11 3 0 1
2006 2 0 0 1 1 10
2007 3 2 1 1 0 0
2008 7 4 1 3 0 0
2009 4 3 1 1 0 0
2010 3 1 0 1 1 0
2011 11 5 1 5 1 0
2012 7 4 3 1 0 0
2013 12 8 2 3 0 0
2014 16 13 5 2 0 1
2015 12 9 3 2 1 0
2016 7 3 1 2 0 1
2017 10 5 4 2 0 0
208 3 1 1 1 0 0
Toa 133 83 40 31 4 3
Table D3 shows that Section 220 cases haveled tothe filing of
133 subsequent merits-based lawsuits over our sample period.
Comparing the number of subsequent suits (133) to the number of all
books and records cases in the second study (699), about 19 percent of
all books and records cases result in the filing of asubsequent merits-
158, EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORP'ORATION
LAW: FUNDAMENTALS 421(3d ed.1994) (quoting Mite Corp. v. Heil-Coli Corp., 256 A. 2d
855, 857-58 (Del. Ch.1969)).
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based lawsuit.1 5 9 Of the total number of subsequent cases, twenty-
seven raise both derivative and class claims and one raises both class
and appraisal claims resulting in an overlap so that the totals at the
bottom of Table D3 exceed the number 133. Keeping this overlap in
mind, the authors find about sixty-two percent of the subsequent
actions are derivative suits (some of which contain class action claims
too), roughly thirty percent are class actions (some of which contain
derivative claims too), and approximately twenty-three percent raise
individual claims, with few other types of cases mixed in. Overall,
these data are consistent with the claim that the tools-at-hand
doctrine is having its greatest impact on derivative suit litigation.
M&A suits are filed much more quickly so Section 220 cases are less
useful. This suggests Delaware needs to rethink how it contains rapid
filing of deal litigation if it wants to encourage the use of Section 220
as a deal litigation improvement device.
E. Important Limitations on Section 220
Despite the important role that Section 220 plays in presuit
discovery, the Delaware legislatures and judiciary have placed some
significant restrictions on it. Recognizing the potential abuse of the
tools at hand, the judiciary has allowed corporations to supplement
the proper purpose requirement for inspection rights with
"reasonable" conditions. Generally, "conditions that are in the
interests of the corporation and its shareholders generally [have been]
allowed." 160 For example, if a stay of discovery in an existing
derivative action is in place, the Chancery has limited production of
books and records so as to avoid sharing of information with anyone
involved in the pending derivative action.161 Second, if books and
records are requested as presuit discovery to support a possible
derivative complaint or direct action, the court has limited
inspections to only those documents required for a "well-pleaded
complaint."16 2
Additionally, the Delaware courts have allowed companies to
condition fulfillment of an inspection request on potential plaintiffs
159. Alternatively, we could calculate this fraction by dividing the number of
subsequent suits (126) by the number of cases alleging mismanagement (437) and find
that twenty-nine percent of cases where the plaintiff is investigating wrongdoing result
in subsequent litigation.
160. Michael Greene, Del. Companies Placing More Conditions on Records
Demands, BLOOMBERG BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS 1 (Aug. 24, 2016) (on file with
author) (quoting Professor Lawrence Hamermesh).
161. See Freund v. Lucent Techs., No. 18893, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3, at *17 (Del,
Ch. Jan. 9, 2003).
162. Kaufman v. CA, Inc., 905 A.2d 749, 753 (Del. Ch. 2006); see also Saito v.
McKesson, HBO, Inc., 806 A.2d 113, 115 (Del. 2002).
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signing confidentiality agreements containing forum selection
provisions. Thus, in United Techs. Corp. v. Treppel, the defendant
conditioned fulfillment of a plaintiffs book and records request on
signing a confidentiality agreement containing a forum selection
provision.' 6 3 The plaintiff refused, and the Chancery Court found for
the plaintiff but, the Delaware Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that "the Court of Chancery erred in concluding it lacked the
statutory authority to impose its own preclusive limitation here."i6 4 It
reasoned that as a textual reading of the statute did not limit the
Chancery Court's authority to restrict the use of books and records, it
had wide discretion to "shape the breadth and use of inspections
under [Section] 220 to protect the legitimate interests of Delaware
corporations."16 5
The Delaware courts have also found that an "incorporation
condition" is reasonable, as it balances the interests of the parties and
the court.s6 6 This condition incorporates by reference the entire books
and records production into any subsequent derivative action
complaint.1 6 7 It allows the court to review the actual documents to
ensure plaintiffs do not "cherry-pick" documents to support their
complaints.16 8 However, some in the plaintiffs' bar argue that this
allows the defendant o misconstrue the record to their benefit.6 9
Finally, some companies have conditioned stock options on
employees waiving their books and records inspection rights. 170
Whether such a waiver will be upheld by the court, however, is
currently unclear. 171 While restrictive, these conditions seem to
reasonably address potential abuse of Section 220.
In conclusion, Section 220 provides shareholders with a very
important right that helps balance the interests of all parties
involved-plaintiffs have the ability to demand information in
preparing their complaint, while defendants are protected from
fishing expeditions and overly litigious shareholders, and the court is
able to maintain judicial economy. However, despite the acclaim of
this doctrine, recent decisions have imposed additional restrictions on
it.
163. United Techs. Corp. v. Treppel, 109 A3d 553, 556 (Del. 2014).
164. Id. at 559.
165. Id.
166. See Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo!, Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 797 (Del. Ch. 2016).
167. Id. at 796,
168. Id. at 797-98.
169. Greene, supra note 160 (quoting Mark Lebovitch).
170. See Rolfe Winkler, Startup Employees Invoke Obscure Law to Open up
Books, WALL ST. J. (May 25, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/startup-employees-
invoke-obscure-law-to-open-up-books-1464082202 [https://perma.cc/6V6K-6ZY6]
(archived Jan. 31, 2020).
171. See id. (quoting Richard Grimm).
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IV. COMPARATIVh ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. General Observations
Both China and Delaware provide for shareholder inspection
rights and many similarities can be seen between them in terms of
the law on the books and the law in practice. By providing access to
relevant information, inspection rights serve as an effective
mechanism to deal with different types of agency problems in the
company: not only the manager-shareholder conflict, which is the
most serious agency problem in the United States, but also the
conflict between majority and minority shareholders, which mainly
plagues the corporate governance system in China.
Inspection rights help to solve the issue of asymmetric
information that is inherent in any principal-agent relationship,
including those in the corporate form. 172 Possession of adequate
information is an important precondition for the principal to
meaningfully monitor whether the agent performs appropriately, and
to decide whether, and how, to take appropriate action.
Despite the general similarities, however, there are significant
differences in how inspection rights are structured in the two
jurisdictions. For instance, the Chinese law tends to have detailed
rules on the application of inspection rights, such as the list of
corporate documents that can be inspected and the list of
circumstances where improper purposes on the part of the applicant
shareholder can be found so as to deny them the right to inspect
relevant documents. In contrast, the Delaware statute is more
standards based, leaving significantly larger room for the court to
exercise ex post review of many issues, including the scope of
corporate documents produced by the defendants and any restrictions
on inspection rights. This is largely due to the fact that standards
cannot be effectively deployed in China, where the judiciary is not
sufficiently sophisticated on business law topics and may lack
independence from the state.
B. Pro-shareholder versus Pro-management
Perhaps because of the political power of the state and of
controlling shareholders, in striking the balance between
shareholders and corporate management, Chinese law is considerably
more favorable to shareholders than the Delaware law. For example,
while both jurisdictions require shareholders to have a proper
1712. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 29-31 (discussing the asymmetrical
principal-agent relationship generally and in corporate environments).
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purpose in requesting documents, the requirements under the
Chinese law are less stringent than those under the Delaware law.1 73
Moreover, the empirical data of this Article is consistent with the
claim that Delaware seems to be more tolerant of attempts to restrict
the exercise of inspection rights through the corporate charter,
bylaws, or other management actions.174 Infact, these differences are
not unique to inspection rights; rather, in general, while the
Delaware corporate law has long had the reputation of being pro-
management, its Chinese counterpart has a plausible claim to
shareholder-friendly law. 175
This difference arises in large part because corporate governance
in China is a three-party game that involves not only shareholders
and managers but also, crucially, the state. As a result of China's
socialism, the state plays multiple roles in the corporate arena, being
an intrusive regulator, a major shareholder, and a defender of
"national champions" in which it may or may not hold an equity
stake.i7 6 The state has traditionally held a majority of outstanding
shares in, and is the controlling shareholder of, many listed
companies.177 Further, the state has control over, and indirect
economic interests in, some of the main institutional investors in
China, including the national social security funds and the funds of
state-owned financial institutions such as banks, securities firms and
insurance companies.1 7 Due to the crucial role the state has in so
many companies, it is unsurprising that the Chinese company law
adopts a pro-shareholder stance on many issues, including inspection
rights.
173. Compare Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8, §220 (West 2010), with 2005 PRO Company
Law, supra note 3.
174. See supra Parts I,11L.D.
175, By 'shareholder-friendly', we mean that the corporate powers are mostly
granted to the shareholders as opposed to the management. See 2005 PRC Company
Law, supra note 3, at § 37 (for LLC) and § 99 (for JSC). In the US, management
decisions fall within the board's exclusive authority to manage the corporation and
fundamental corporate decisions such as mergers and charter amendments must be
initiated by the board. In China, however, the shareholders have initiation and veto
powers in relation to a wide range of matters, including management and personnel
issues. Hence, under the shareholder-centric model of corporate governance in China,
the main agency problem is not the shareholder-manager conflict, but the conflict
between the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders.
176. See Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are the (National) Champions:
Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697
(2013).
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C. Governance Strategies versus Litigation Strategies
While Chinese inspection right cases generate useful information
for bringing subsequent shareholder suits, the empirical findings in
this Article show this use seems to be less frequent than in Delaware:
as shown earlier, the ratio of subsequent cases to sampled cases in
China is 12.4 percent, which is lower than that in the United States
(17.9 percent). A plausible explanation for this difference is that
China and the United States rely on different strategies for reducing
agency costs in the company.
In general, the legal strategies for controlling agency costs can be
broadly divided into two groups, namely governance strategies and
regulatory strategies. There are strong complementarities between
the structure of share ownership and the types of legal strategies
relied upon most heavily to control agency costs.17 9 In China, where
the ownership of shares is highly concentrated, the shareholders face
relatively low coordination costs in taking action. 1so Hence, it is
easier for the shareholders to rely on governance strategies to control
managers, and also for small shareholders to unite against majority
shareholders.
By contrast, in the United States where companies normally
have dispersed ownership, the coordination costs for the shareholders
are higher. 181 This inhibits shareholders' ability to engage in
collective action and makes governance strategies less effective. Thus,
regulatory strategies are more heavily relied upon in the form of
public enforcement actions by regulators and private litigation by
shareholders.8 2
Unlike the Delaware board-centric company law, the Chinese
company law is shareholder centric, granting the shareholder
meeting powers over a wide range of corporate affairs, including the
appointment and removal of directors, changing constitutional
provisions, the company's capital structure, and direct decision rights
over various types of major transactions.' 8 3 Shareholders can exercise
these powers to address corporate governance problems with less
need for corporate litigation. Armed with information obtained from
inspection right cases, the shareholders can better determine whether
to appoint or remove directors; whether to ratify management
decisions on key issues; whether to approve the remuneration scheme
for directors; whether to exit the company by exercising their
appraisal rights in suitable circumstances, or simply selling shares in
179. See KAAKMAN ET AL, supra note 4, at 46.
180. See supra Part I.
181. See supra Part III.
182. See supra Part II.
183. 2005 PRC Company Law, supra note 3, at §37 (for LLC) and §99 (for JS).
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the market; as well as whether and how to bring litigation against
corporate management.
D. Procedural Differences in Shareholder Litigation
There are important differences in the types of subsequent
shareholder litigation initiated in each of the two countries after
shareholder inspection suits. Most importantly, in subsequent
litigation, class actions and derivative suits are conspicuously absent
in China, while they accounted for 20 percent and 46 percent of all
subsequent cases filed in the United States. As will be explained
below, there are good reasons for these differences.
China has a civil procedure for collective litigation, which is
dubbed the Chinese-style class action, which bears some resemblance
to the class action in the United States but also has some important
differences.184 A uniquefeatureofChinese-style class actions in JSCs
(i.e., securities class actions) is the procedural prerequisite that in
order to bring a class action for securities fraud misstatements, there
must be a prior criminal judgement or administrative sanction
decision by the relevant regulators, notably the China Securities
Regulatory Commission.1 8 5 This means that securities class actions
can only follow public enforcement of securities law. As a result, the
shareholder plaintiffs have ready access to relevant information
generated in the prior criminal proceeding or administrative sanction
decision. Indeed, the civil court can simply rely on the fact finding
about securities fraud misstatements from the prior proceeding, such
as false accounting records. As a result, there is a very high rate of
recovery for the Chinese plaintiff shareholders in securities fraud
cases.1 8 6 For the purposes of this Article, this is important because
there is little need for the plaintiff shareholders to resort to an
inspection suit to obtain relevant information to subsequently initiate
legal action.
For derivative actions, Chinese law is broadly similar to US law,
but again with some important differences.1 87 Similar to the demand
requirement in the United States, the Chinese derivative suit regime
184. See Robin Hui Huang, Rethinking the Relationship between Public
Regulation and Private Litigation: Evidence from Securities Class Action in China, 19
THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L.333, 339-41 (2018). The key difference is that while the US-
style class action adopts an opt-out rule, the Chinese-style class action follows the "opt-
in" rule under which in order to become members of a class, the plaintiffs need to
register with the court at the time the case is filed, or later bring suits within a
prescribed time period.
185. See Robin Hui Huang, Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: A
Ten-year Retrospective and Empirical Assessment, 61AM. J.COMP. L. 757, 764 (2013).
186. See id.
187. 2005 PRC Company Law, supra note 3, at art. 151.
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has a presuit procedural requirement under which before actually
filing a derivative suit, the plaintiff needs to first demand in writing
that the company (through its board of supervisors) initiate a direct
lawsuit against the alleged wrongdoers who caused harm to the
company.1 88 Once the demand has been made, the plaintiff may
proceed to bring the derivative suit if the demand is rejected, or if the
demand is not acted upon by the company within thirty days of its
receipt.1 8 9I In addition, the plaintiff shareholder can bring a derivative
suit without making a demand if the failure to lodge such an action
immediately will cause irreparable injury to the company.190
Empirical research shows that as long as a demand is served to
the company and then rejected by the company, the plaintiff
shareholder can proceed with the derivative suit, regardless of the
company's reason for the rejection.191 In other words, once it has
received the demand, the company cannot stop the derivative suit
from being instituted unless the company decides to bring action
itself. As a result, the Chinese demand requirement seems a pure
formality and the shareholder plaintiffs do not need to exercise their
inspection rights to obtain information to meet the demand
requirement.
In Delaware, however, a stockholder cannot pursue a derivative
suit once demand on the board is made because the board is entitled
to assume control of the litigation if demand is made. Rather, the
plaintiff will usually plead demand futility and seek to disqualify the
board from dismissing the case.192 However, in doing so, they are not
entitled to discovery to get relevant information to prove demand
futility, 193and thus the so-called tools at hand doctrine has been
developed in Delaware under which the plaintiffs can use the
inspection rights as an information-gathering tool for the purpose of
excusing a demand. 1 9 4 Thus, it is not surprising that there are a
substantial number of subsequent actions filed in the United States,
and about sixty-two percent of them are derivative suits.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article shows that shareholder inspection rights play an




191. See Huang, Derivative Litigation, supra note 44, at 639.
192. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 60, at 90-91.
193. Scatter Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch,, Inc., 701 A.2d 70, 77 (Del. 1997).
194. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984); Rales v. Blasband, 634
A.2d 934 (Del. 1993); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216, 1218 (Del 1996).
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hypothesizes that the primary reason that the law provides for these
rights, and that shareholders exercise them, is to help shareholders
monitor the actions of corporate management. While Chinese
corporate governance and American corporate governance face
different sets of agency cost problems, improved shareholder
monitoring creates important benefits in both of them.
Shareholder inspection statutes in both countries are broadly
similar: each requires that investors make an initial demand on the
board, state a proper purpose, and detail the documents sought.
However, beneath these similarities there lurk some significant
differences. For example, both countries' legal rules require that
shareholders state a proper purpose, but the Chinese law creates
statutory categories that are limited in scope, whereas the Delaware
system relies on broad judge-made categories.
Finally, the empirical analysis of this Article also sheds light on
how inspection rights operate on the ground. It finds that many
inspection cases are filed in both China and in Delaware. These cases
are resolved by the courts relatively quickly. While inspection rights
in both countries are frequently used as a presuit discovery device,
the types of subsequent litigation that can be filed in each country are
quite different.
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